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REPARATIONS POLITICS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY
John Torpey"
One of the more remarkable political developments in recent years has
been the worldwide proliferation of efforts to compel states, churches, and
private firms to take responsibility for past wrongdoing and to recompense
those harmed in the process. The spread of "reparations" payments and
other compensation for various historical injustices calls sharply into
question the age-old idea from Thucydides that "the standard of justice
depends on the ... power to compel, and ... the strong do what they have
the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept." Until after
World War II, the notion of "reparations" referred to a fine among states that
was levied on the loser of a conflict, who was then said by the winners to
have caused the disruption and resulting damage and thus to be liable for
compensating the victors for their losses. With the establishment of the
Holocaust as the principal benchmark of contemporary historical
consciousness, however, the response to the victims of the Nazi genocide -
that is, the payment of reparations for various kinds of suffering - has come
to play an increasingly central role in political thinking in many other areas
as well.
In this essay, I address a number of aspects of the global spread of what I
call "reparations politics" - that is, attempts to come to terms with past
injustices by means of monetary and other kinds of material compensation.
First, I outline a framework for understanding the three main sources and
the two principal types of demands for reparations. Next, I discuss the
consolidation of the Holocaust as a standard and its "globalization" as a
model for such demands. In .the third section, I discuss the ways in which
the enshrinement of the Holocaust as a standard for all "actionable"
historical injustices has provoked renewed attention to the misdeeds
committed in the "Pacific theater" of World War II, which reflects in part the
involvement of diasporas in reparations politics. Finally, I offer some
observations on the politics of reparations politics and its connections with
broader political developments in the post-Cold War world.
* Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology at the University of
British Columbia.
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Throughout this discussion, I argue that the concept of race is at the
heart of the current worldwide proliferation of demands for "reparations,"
largely as a result of the delegitimation of racial discrimination since the
Holocaust. In the aftermath of the Nazi genocide, invidious racial
distinctions have come to be seen as an unacceptable violation of "human
rights," and the proliferation of demands for reparations has so far involved
more than anything else the righting of injustices based on racial hierarchies.
The paradox is that attempts to get beyond race ineluctably involve the
simultaneous rejection of that category as a basis for discriminatory
treatment, and its re-assertion as the basis for claims to compensation. Paul
Gilroy's pleas for the inauguration of a political culture "beyond the color
line" will remain unrealized for the foreseeable future for a variety of
reasons, not least the necessity of highlighting racial and other kinds of
difference as the foundation of claims for reparations.' This rejection and re-
assertion of racial difference is the enduring agony and perverse triumph of
the race idea: poor people can become better-off, but people cannot change
how they look, nor their ascription to particular groups by powerful others.
I. THE SOURCES AND TYPES OF REPARATIONS DEMANDS
The various claims for reparations for historical injustices now being
raised constitute major challenges to numerous states around the world. The
shift in the liability of states for past actions that is inherent in the spread of
reparations claims may confront officials of government, churches,
corporations and international financial institutions with demands for
substantial monetary compensation, far-reaching and potentially costly
rehabilitative policies, and even the cession of certain aspects of sovereignty
over parts of national territories. My focus will be on reparations claims
directed at states, however, because states have so far constituted the
principal targets of such claims and because claims against churches and
private firms typically result in responses worked out in close collaboration
with, if not directly by, states. 2
'See PAUL GILROY, AGAINST RACE: IMAGINING POLITICAL CULTURE BEYOND THE COLOR LINE
(2000).
2 As for example in the recent settlement of claims arising from the exploitation of forced
and slave labor by German companies during the Nazi period. See Edmund L. Andrews,
Germans Sign Agreement to Pay Forced Laborers of Nazi Era, NEW YORK TIMES (West Coast edition),
July 18,2000, at A3. See also the Canadian government's plan for dealing with the abuses arising
from the forcible assimilation of native children through residential schools run by both the
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Broadly stated, the various campaigns for reparations for past injustices
bespeak the dawning of a new phase in relations between states and the
groups that they have victimized historically, and the outcome of these
campaigns may well influence the future willingness of state actors to
oppress other groups. Demands for reparations are part of a broader
challenge to state power and sovereignty that has been one of the major
consequences of the post-Holocaust era. In short, the stakes involved in the
proliferation of reparations claims are very significant indeed.
There are three basic sources of claims for reparations. First are those
cases arising from acts of injustice perpetrated during World War II. These
include claims arising from state-sponsored mass killing, forced labor, and
sexual exploitation on the part of the Axis powers (Germany and Japan, but
also Austria), as well as from the unjust wartime incarceration of those of
Japanese descent in Allied countries (the United States and Canada) and
from economic or other kinds of collaboration in Nazi crimes by putatively
neutral countries (Switzerland, France, the Netherlands).
Next are those claims ensuing, in the aftermath of "transitions to
democracy," from "state terrorism" and other authoritarian practices in Latin
America, Eastern Europe, and South Africa in recent years. These contexts,
however, have been more notable for generating quasi-legal inquiries into
past complicity with the old regime ("truth commissions") and purges of
collaborators than demands for monetary compensation as such.
Reparations claims in these contexts tend to be concerned with the
restoration to individuals of specific parcels of real estate or other assets,
rather than with the return of broad domains to groups or with
compensation for non-concrete harms that is typical of other reparations
claims.3
Coming to terms with the past in these countries has primarily
concerned clarifying the circumstances under which victims of the regime
suffered and prosecuting at least some of the perpetrators. As Tina
Rosenberg has pointed out, the appropriateness of prosecutions depends on
whether the states in question were "regimes of criminals" (Latin America)
government and churches in Gathering Strength: Canada's Aboriginal Action Plan, January 7,1998,
available at httv://www.inac.gc.ca/gs/index-e.html.
3 On restitution and privatization in Eastern Europe, see ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF
NATIONS: REgTIriON AND AMENDING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (2000).
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or "criminal regimes" (Eastern Europe). 4 The victims in these countries are
generally understood in political rather than racial terms, and they only
constitute a group as a result of their shared experience of political
repression.5 The South African case is actually a mixed one, combining
aspects of this second source of reparations claims with the third - namely,
demands for reparations stemming from colonialism.
Demands for reparations arising from colonialism can be broken down
further, depending on whether the variant of colonialism referred to is the
"classical" European version, one or another variant of "internal
colonialism" (e.g., slavery, Jim Crow, apartheid), 6 or more recent "neo-
colonial" structures and institutions. With respect to claims emerging from
the aftermath of classical European colonialism, we witness claims for
reparations both by the formerly colonized, especially in Africa, and by a
variety of "indigenous" groups against states dominated by the descendants
of their European conquerors. More recently, demands for reparations have
been raised against international lending agencies that are regarded by some
as the causes of Third World poverty and environmental destruction, rather
than as protagonists of their cure. During the protests against the activities
of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund held in Washington,
D.C. during April 2000, for example, activists insisted that the World Bank
should pay reparations for its funding of dams that have allegedly displaced
over 10 million people from their homes and land, caused severe
environmental damage, and driven impoverished borrowers further into
debt. These demands have overlapped to some extent, at least, with claims
that indigenous peoples suffered particularly from these policies.
In contrast to these three sources of reparations demands, I argue that
there are two basic types of reparations claims. First are those that seek to
The best work on coming to terms with the past in the former Communist countries is
TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE'S GHOSTS AFTER COMMUNISM (1995).
See also Tina Rosenberg, In Chile, the Balance Tips Toward the Victims, NEW YORK TIMES (West
Coast edition) August 22, 2000, at A26.
5 Sharon McConnell, Is Truth Enough? Reparations and Reconciliation in Latin America, paper
presented at the symposium Politics and the Past: On Repairing Historical Injustices, University of
British Columbia, February 25-26, 2000. In order to bolster their claims for reparations for the
victims of East European Communist regimes, the authors of THE BLACK BOOK OF COMMUNISM
have sought to make a case for the quasi-racial nature of the victim groups. See ST9PHANE
COURTOIS, et. al., THE BLACK BOOK OF COMMUNISM: CRIMES, TERROR, REPRESSION (1999), and
John Torpey What Future for the Future? Reflections on the Black Book of Communism, 2 HUM. RTS.
REV. 2 (2001).
6 On the concept of "internal colonialism," see ROBERT BLAUNER, RACIAL OPPRESSION IN
AMERICA (1972).
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compensate persons whose physical victimization took place in the past and
who now suffer principally psychological scars. These claims can best be
characterized as commemorative in nature. They call attention to the acute
barbarity or humiliation associated with past mistreatment of individual
members of the group. In these cases, reparations are largely symbolic
attempts to give official recognition to the recipients' past victimization. The
claims arising from World War II are typically of this first type, although of
course Holocaust survivors and comfort women may also have physical
ailments deriving from their victimization during the war.
Commemorative reparations projects tend to be backward-looking, not
necessarily connected to current economic disadvantage, and dependent on
the cultivation of a consciousness of victimhood among both so-called
"survivors" and the broader public. It is true, as analysts of the nature of
successful reparations claims have noted,7 that some harm to reparations
claimants must persist into the present. Yet commemorative reparations
projects are not generally motivated by attempts to repair ongoing economic
damage, and the harm to be repaired by compensation is often strictly
psychological. Indeed, those seeking reparations of a commemorative nature
may be affronted by the appearance that they are after "welfare" rather than
recognition of the wrongs done to them.8
In contrast to commemorative reparations projects, claims for
reparations may be rooted in assertions that a past system of domination
(colonialism, apartheid, slavery, segregation) was unjust and is the cause of
continuing economic disadvantage suffered by those who lived under these
systems or their descendants in the present day. Claims related to the
various forms of colonialism are generally of this latter type. However, the
reparations campaigns of groups whose oppression took or takes place on
territories ruled by the descendants of Europeans (indigenous peoples,
African-Americans) often involve a commemorative cultivation of
ethnocultural victimization and loss that makes their efforts to claim
reparations similar to the first type. Far from being purely commemorative,
the reparations movements are transformative in nature.
7 See Roy Brooks, The Age of Apology, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY
OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICES 7 (Roy Brooks ed. 1999), citing Mar
Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
323 (1987).
8 George Hicks, The Comfort Women Redress Movement, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH. Id. at
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Transformative reparations movements are more forward-looking in
character; they view reparations as a means of improving the current
conditions of deprivation suffered by the groups in question; and they are
more frequently connected to broader projects of social transformation than
are commemorative projects.9 In these cases, the demand for reparations is a
tactical political move in a historical period that lacks the capacious,
inclusive vision of progressive social change that was once supplied by
socialism and the American civil rights movement. For these groups, who
find other channels toward progress blocked, the road to the future runs
through the prolonged disasters of the past.
Demands for reparations deriving from now-defunct authoritarian
regimes tend to fall between these two stools, not least because political
stigmatization is more easily left behind than the ethnoracial stigmata on the
basis of which the other groups were principally mistreated or exploited.
Political apostasy, however severely or unjustly punished, is not carried like
a mark of Cain by future generations; only those who suffered it directly, or
their immediate families, can plausibly demand compensation.
Rather than falling between the stools of the two types of reparations
campaigns, the South African case straddles them in ways that point to the
complexity of its post-apartheid challenges. Mahmood Mamdani makes a
similar point when he notes that, in the discussions leading up to the
creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "the Latin American
analogy obscured the colonial nature of the South African context: the link
between conquest and dispossession, between racialised power and
racialised privilege, between perpetrator and beneficiary." 10 In one of the
more heavily criticized aspects of its operations, the TRC's reparations
mandate concerned only the victims of gross violations of human rights by
the forces of the apartheid state, not the much more numerous victims of the
apartheid system per se.11 The TRC's reparations payments - still barely
paid out as of early 2001 - are thus to be understood, in terms of the
distinctions outlined above, as strictly commemorative in nature. In part this
9 For a different conceptual framework for understanding the nature of reparations claims
which stresses the difference between individual and group reparations, see Roy Brooks, The
Age of Apology, supra note 7, at 3.
10 Mahmood Mamdani, A Diminished Truth, in AFTER THE TRC: REFLECTIONS ON TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 59 (Wilmot James and Linda Van de Vijver, eds. 2000).
I1 See Heribert Adam and Kanya Adam, 77Te Politics of Memory in Divided Societies, in AFTER
THE TRC. Id., at 51. For an examination of the difficulties associated with the implementation of
the 1994 Restitution of Lands Act, see MARJ BROWN, et. al., LAND RESTITUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA:
A LONG WAY HOME (1998).
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reflects the relatively poor ability to pay on the part of the post-apartheid
government, and points to the reality that reparations payments of any kind
- but especially those of a transformative character - presuppose a source of
compensation with relatively deep pockets.
In contrast to the TRC's purely commemorative reparations, demands
for reparations of a transformative nature in the South African context have
originated chiefly from elements in civil society. A number of activists
recently promulgated a "Declaration of Commitment by White South
Africans," which "acknowledge[s] that apartheid inflicted massive social,
economic, cultural and psychological damage on black South Africans" and
pledges to create a "Development and Reconciliation Fund" to help
overcome the economic inequalities caused by past racial discrimination.' 2
On December 16, 2000, a number of groups launched the South African
Reparations Campaign, "which "will focus on recovery from the countless
national and international banks, financial institutions, transnationals,
corporations, businesses, mining companies, groups and individuals who
perpetrated, assisted in, funded and benefited from our oppression."' 3 A
movement for reparations that is intended to overcome the social dislocation
caused by the apartheid system as such borrows the language and tactics of
the efforts pioneered by those pursuing commemorative reparations for the
crimes of the Nazis, and applies them in a campaign for reparations of the
transformative variety. There can be no better example of the ways in which
responses to the Holocaust have played a central role in contemporary
thinking about politics in places far removed from the overwhelmingly
European sites of the Nazis' crimes.
II. THE HOLOCAUST AS STANDARD AND MODEL
Despite their differences in character, the various types of reparations
claims frequently share the common feature that the Holocaust is regarded
as a standard for judging the seriousness of, and as a template for claiming
compensation for, past injustices. Far from a merely "local" event of little
relevance to those outside the Euro-Atlantic world, the recent spread of
demands for reparations in other contexts follows from the fact that the
12 See http://www.homeforall.org.za/ENG/declarationENG.htm. See also Henri E.
Cauvin, In Africa, a Mea Culpa For Apartheid Tests Whites, NEW YORK TIMES (West Coast edition),
December 17, 2000, at 25.
13 1 quote here from a document titled Announcement of a Reparations Conference, made
available to me by Art Serota, an activist in the movement.
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Holocaust has come to comprise the "true emblem"14 of our age. The perfidy
of the Nazi assault on European Jewry has emerged as a kind of "gold
standard" against which to judge other cases of injustice and to which
advocates seek to assimilate those instances of human cruelty and
oppression for which they seek reparations. Contrary to those who regard
the Holocaust as a sponge of historical memory that sucks the juices out of
projects seeking compensation for other historical injustices, the very
opposite is the case: the Holocaust has become the central metaphor for all
reparations politics.
The Black Book of Communism, published in France in 1997 to intense
controversy that was repeated when German and Italian editions appeared
soon thereafter, made this point malgr6 lui in the very act of insisting that
Communist crimes were more atrocious and hence more deserving of
recompense than those of the Holocaust. In the provocative introduction to
what otherwise were relatively sober (if macabre) country-by-country
analyses of Communist misdeeds, editor St~phane Courtois asserted, against
much countervailing evidence, that "in contrast to the Jewish Holocaust,
which the international Jewish community has actively commemorated, it
has been impossible for victims of Communism and their legal advocates to
keep the memory of the tragedy alive, and any requests for commemoration
or demands for reparations are brushed aside .... A single-minded focus on
the Jewish genocide in an attempt to characterize the Holocaust as a unique
atrocity has also prevented an assessment of other episodes of comparable
magnitude in the Communist world." Is It was this kind of extraordinary
outburst that led some of the contributors to The Black Book to distance
themselves publicly from Courtois' introduction and indeed from the book
itself.
The controversies over the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust16 reprise the
central arguments of the Historikerstreit of the mid-1980s, a major
intellectual-political donnybrook from which the defenders of the
14 DAN DINER, DAS JAHRHUNDERT VERSTEHEN: EINE UNIVERSALHISTORISCHE DEUTUNG 66
(2000).
'5 St~phane Courtois, Introduction: The Crimes of Communism, in THE BLACK BOOK OF
COMMUNISM, supra note 5, at 23.
16 See ALAIN BESAN(CON, LA MALHEUR DU SItCLE: SUR LE COMMUNISME, LE NAZISME, ET LA
UNICIT# DE SHOAH (1998). For a critique of this view, see Henry Rousso, La ILgitimitd d'une
comparaison Empirique, in Rousso, ed., STALINISME ET NAZISME: HISTOIRE ET M9MOIRE COMPARIES
(1999).
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"uniqueness" thesis emerged triumphant. 17 The post-Cold War renewal of
competition over whether the Nazis or the Communists were responsible for
greater evil, in which The Black Book of Communism has been perhaps the most
inflammatory intervention, thus seems something of a rear-guard action,
with relatively little prospect of transforming our perception of the larger
meaning of the twentieth century. Dan Diner has suggested one important
reason for this state of affairs: our understanding of Communist brutality
("sociocide") is a matter of "knowledge," not of the sort of "memory" that
helps constitute an ethnic self-understanding that persists through historical
time.'8 Ethnic and racial conceptions of groups are more likely to have
visible, ongoing referents than classes. That fact undermines the likelihood
that class-related injustices will capture the imagination of the successors of
those who suffered them and make them into the focus of a campaign for
commemoration and reparations.
The strenuous efforts in The Black Book to demonstrate the extent to
which Communist oppression had ethnoracial dimensions bear
unintentional witness to the validity of this insight. Thus, in the book's
chapter on Cambodia, Jean-Louis Margolin writes: "For the Khmer Rouge, as
for the Chinese Communists, some social groups were criminal by nature,
and this criminality was seen as transmittable from husband to wife, as well
as an inherited trait .... We can speak of the racialization of social groups,
and the crime of genocide therefore can be applied to their physical
elimination."19 Margolin is pointing to a crucial feature of the interpretation
of the crime of genocide as it has come to be understood since the Holocaust
assumed its dominant role in contemporary historical consciousness:
namely, that the notion of genocide has mainly come to be applied to groups
defined in ethnoracial terms, despite the Genocide Convention's inclusion of
"national" and "religious" groups as possible victims of that crime. Diner's
observation about the difficulties of constructing "actionable" historical
memory on the experiences of economically defined groups is thus very
much to the point.
17 See CHARLES MAIER, THE UNMASTERABLE PAST: HISTORY, HOLOCAUST, AND GERMAN
NATIONAL IDENTITY (1988).
18 DAN DINER, DAS JAHRHUNDERT VERSTEHEN, supra note 14, at 233.
19 See Margolin, Cambodia in THE BLACK BOOK OF COMMUNISM, supra note 5, at 634. For an
extended discussion of the "racialization" of social groups and its relation to state-sponsored
killing, see Eric Weitz, Race, Nation, Class: Das 'Schwarzbuch des Kommunismus' und das Problem
des Vergleichs zwischen nationalsozialistischen und sowjetischen Verbrechen, 22 WERKSTATT
GESCHICHTE 75 (1999).
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Despite the contrasting political implications, the dyspeptic views of the
centrality of the Holocaust in contemporary memory observable in recent
French discussions overlap in one crucial respect with Peter Novick's recent
critical assessment of the stature of the Holocaust in American historical
memory.20 Both those seeking greater recognition of Communist misdeeds
and those such as Novick who observe with some skepticism the steady
growth of the Holocaust in American public discourse argue that the Shoah
has assumed a place of such overriding prominence in our mental landscape
that it may be difficult to accord adequate attention to other human
catastrophes. In contrast to those seeking to promote the commemoration of
Communist crimes, Novick's critique comes from the future, so to speak; he
wishes us to view the Holocaust as a cautionary tale leading us to re-double
our efforts to forestall any repetition of its horrors, not as an episode redolent
with "lessons" about the shadow side of human nature and certainly not as
an event on which to fix our political fantasy to the exclusion of other,
avoidable catastrophes yet unimagined. The convergence of views between
the two camps regarding the predominant position of the Holocaust in
current discussions of historical injustices is nonetheless striking, and
bespeaks the towering significance of that episode in contemporary
consciousness.
In a trenchant discussion of interpretations of twentieth-century history,
Charles Maier has challenged this evaluation of the importance of the
Holocaust in contemporary politics outside the Euro-Atlantic world. Maier
argues that those in other parts of the world view the preoccupation with the
moral narrative of the Holocaust as "parochial," a diversion from the
outrages done to those in the once-colonial world in the name of progress
and civilization.21 It is altogether appropriate for Maier to remind us that
those outside the North Atlantic world are likely to think differently about
the past than those from the colonial "metropoles." Those in the former
colonies of European countries will understandably be more familiar with
and attuned to the misfortunes that have befallen those closest to them in
distance and time.
Yet there is every indication that intellectuals in (or at least from) the
Third World are sharply aware of the extent to which the Holocaust and its
20 PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE (1999). Novick's discussion is more
persuasive than the outraged stance adopted in NORMAN FINKELSTEIN, THE HOLOCAUST
INDUSTRY: REFLECTIONS ON THE EXPLOITATION OF JEWISH SUFFERING (2000).
21 Charles Maier, Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the
Modern Era, 105 AMER. HIsT. REv. 826 (2000).
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legal and financial consequences may be relevant to their own situation. For
example, in the early 1990s the Organization of African Unity appointed a
so-called "Group of Eminent Persons" with the mandate "to explore the
modalities and strategies of an African campaign of restitution similar to the
compensation paid by Germany to Israel and the survivors of the Nazi
Holocaust."22  Commenting on the proliferation of efforts to obtain
reparations for various historical injustices in the context of a shrinking
globe, the Nobel Prize-winning Nigerian novelist Wole Soyinka has written
that "it is not possible to ignore the example of the Jews and the obsessed
commitment of survivors of the Holocaust, and their descendants, to recover
both their material patrimony and the humanity of which they were brutally
deprived."23
Similarly, in Namibia, representatives of the Herero people have
pursued a campaign for reparations against the Germans for a pre-World
War I massacre that reduced their numbers from approximately 80,000 to
around 15,000 between 1904 and 1907. The Namibian claimants have
asserted a parallel to the Holocaust in an extermination order issued by
Lieutenant General Lothar von Trotha (although no such order has ever been
found in the Nazi case).24 In a further instance of this African appropriation
of the Holocaust and its consequences, the recent report by the International
Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda
and the Surrounding Events notes in its recommendations concerning
reparations that "the case of Germany after World War Two is pertinent
here."" Such references to the exemplary character of the response to the
Shoah for those who have suffered violence and degradation elsewhere
22 All A. Mazrui, Who Should Pay for Slatvy? 40 WORLD PRESS REv. (Aug. 1993), at 22
23 See WOLE SOYINKA, THE BURDEN OF MEMORY, THE MUSE OF FORGIVENESS 83 (1999).
24 Local descendants of the German colonists are less concerned about reparations
payments coming from the German government; their fear is that the Herero could make
inroads on the millions of acres of ranches they own in the country. Recent developments in
Zimbabwe make such fears seem far from paranoid.
The Herero quest for reparations also appears to have been bolstered by comparable events
elsewhere. Upon hearing of the Japanese recognition of crimes against some of those whom
they sexually exploited during the Second World War, one of the Herero's leaders, who like
many Herero has a German grandparent, said: "I thought, hey, that's my grandmother - a
comfort woman. And I thought, if the Japanese could pay for that, the Germans could [too]."
See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Its Past on its Sleeve, Tribe Seeks Bonn's Apology, NEW YORK TIMES (West
Coast edition), May 31, 1998, at A3. For details of the German atrocities against the Herero, see
Jon Swan, The Final Solution in Southwest Africa, 3 MHQ: THE Q. J. OF MILITARY HIS. 36 (1991).
25 The report, issued on July 7, 2000, can be found on the OAU's website at
<http://www.oau-oua.org/Document/ipep/ipeR.htm>; the quoted passage appears in
Chapter 24, "Recommendations."
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demonstrate that, far from obscuring their suffering from view, the
emblematic status for our time of the Jewish Holocaust has helped others
who have been subjected to state-sponsored mass atrocities to gain attention
for those calamities - though hardly all of them, to be sure.
Our world is thus populated by "one, two, many Holocausts," to
paraphrase a slogan from the Vietnam era. The "victory" that went to those
who defended the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust in the Historikerstreit of
the mid-1980s has since been overtaken by the efforts of those seeking to gain
attention to various historical injustices and who, in so doing, find
"holocausts" of many kinds in the historical inheritance of our age. The
proliferation of holocausts inflates the term and undermines the notion of the
uniqueness of the Nazi genocide, but - given the exemplary role of the
Holocaust in contemporary historical consciousness - it does encourage
attention to other catastrophic experiences from the past.2
The consolidation of the Holocaust as a standard for thinking about
other historical injustices has stimulated a vigorous competition for
recognition of various historical injustices as "Holocaust-like" or "worse than
the Holocaust." The charge of "genocide" having come to mean a set of acts
comparable to the Holocaust, application of that label has become an
important objective of those seeking to gain attention to and compensation
for past atrocities. Commentators and activists concerned with the horrors of
Communism, the legacies of the African slave trade, and the fate of non-
white indigenous populations at the hands of European colonizers have been
in the forefront of these efforts.27 The recent efforts by Armenians in the
United States and France to obtain an official declaration that the 1915
massacres at the hands of the Turks constituted a "genocide" are particularly
relevant here. One unseemly result of the establishment of the Holocaust as
the "gold standard" of persecution, however, is that it may provoke a contest
for the status of worst-victimized. Pressing the issue of reparations to Africa
for the ravages caused by the slave trade, the African scholar Ali Mazrui has
written bluntly: "Twelve years of Jewish hell - against several centuries of
black enslavement." 28
26 On this point, see Samantha Power, To Suffer by Comparison?, paper presented at the 1999
Annual Meeting of the Social Science History Association, Fort Worth, TX, November 1999.
2 For representative examples, see RUSSELL THORNTON, AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND
SURVIVAL: A POPULATION HISTORY SINCE 1492 (1987) and DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN
HOLOCAUST: COLUMBUS AND THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD (1992).
2 Mazrui, Who Should Pay for Slavery? supra note 22, at 22.
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Despite the tendency to spark a competition for victim status, it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Holocaust has emerged as the model
for other historical disasters in part precisely because it has been so
politically fecund, facilitating demands for reparations by other groups that
have suffered tragic histories. This has been especially true of the victims of
Japanese aggression during World War II, whose stories have received a
resurgence of attention in the years following the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
III. THE RETURN OF THE "PACIFIC THEATER" OF WORLD WAR II AND THE ROLE OF
DIASPORAS IN REPARATIONS POLITICS
The emergence of the Nazi Holocaust as a standard for other historical
catastrophes has also promoted a healthy upsurge of attention to other
"holocausts." One of the leading examples of this trend has been the case of
Japanese atrocities in the Pacific theater of World War II. Notwithstanding
the fact that that conflict came to be known in North America as "the Pacific
war," it was not so much an ocean-spanning war between Japan and the
United States as a Japanese war against other Asians that was transformed
by the American occupation and American domination of the Tokyo War
Crimes trials into a "Pacific War." 29 No whitewashing of European racial
domination should be inferred from a reminder that the Japanese drive for
domination of the Pacific was very much motivated by ideas of ethnoracial
superiority vis-a-vis their Asian neighbors.
Public attention to the crimes of the Japanese has been strongly
promoted by the appearance of Iris Chang's The Rape of Nanking, notably
subtitled The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. Chang's book is less a
scholarly analysis of the tragic episode in the Chinese capital in 1937 than an
extended plea for reparations for it. But the renewed attention to Japanese
atrocities in general, and to the Nanjing massacre in particular, has also
stimulated more serious treatment of the events themselves and of their role
in popular consciousness in Japan, China, and elsewhere. The comparison
between Japanese and German responses to the World War II past, in
particular, has begun to be re-evaluated.
It has long been the conventional wisdom that the Germans have been
disproportionately more forthcoming than the Japanese with regard to
See JOHN DOwER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR 11 (1999).
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"coming to terms" with that past.30 The continued resistance of the Japanese
government to a full-scale official apology for their wartime crimes and the
openness with which Japanese nationalists can and still do dispute the
atrocities at Nanjing suggests that this interpretation contains a significant
element of truth.31 By way of comparison, Holocaust denial is illegal in
Germany, and any public statement that Shoah had never occurred would be
met with considerable public outcry. Yet this "good cop-bad cop"
assessment of the differences between the two countries also glosses over a
number of difficulties.
First of all, the Germans hardly leapt with alacrity to confront the Nazi
past in the immediate postwar years; this self-reflection was at first largely
imposed upon them by the Allies, and only became widespread as an
"indigenous" phenomenon in the late 1960s. Germans tended to be much
more preoccupied with co-ethnic "victims" of the war, particularly those
driven out of the Eastern territories who had long been settled there or who
went there at the behest of the Third Reich to populate newly acquired
Lebensraum. Next, the extent of the concern with coming to terms with the
Nazi past differed dramatically in the two halves of the divided country.
The Communist leadership in East Germany was for the most part quite
hostile to any reparations payments to the state of Israel, which they quickly
came to regard as an outpost of "Western imperialism" rather than as the
repository of Jews' hopes for a state of their own that would protect them
from future Holocausts. Still, the Soviets dismantled a significant percentage
of the fledgling GDR's industrial capacity and transported it back to the
USSR as "reparations." Once the West Germans did agree to pay reparations
to individual Jews and to the state of Israel in the early 1950s, they put
substantial bureaucratic hurdles in the way of potential claimants. Finally,
there were efforts on the part of leftist forces in early postwar Japan to
assume responsibility for the crimes perpetrated against other Asian peoples
and to pay reparations, but these were soon thwarted by the return to power
30 See IAN BURUMA, THE WAGES OF GUILT: MEMORIES OF WAR IN GERMANY AND JAPAN
(1994).
31 For a report of one of the more recent examples, see Howard W. French, Japanese Call '37
Massacre a War Myth, Stirring Storm, NEW YORK TIMES (West Coast edition), January 23, 2000, at
A5. At the same time, there are certainly outspoken opponents of this view; see Howard W.
French, Internet Raiders in Japan Denounce Rape of Nanjing, NEW YORK TIMES (West Coast edition),
January 31, 2000, at A8. For a valuable discussion of the state of the scholarly and public debates
on the Nanjing massacre in both China and Japan, see Daqing Yang, Convergence or Divergence?
Recent Historical Writings on the Rape of Nanjing, 104 AMER. HIST. REV. 842 (1999).
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of a conservative elite under the aegis of MacArthur's occupation
administration. 32
In short, "coming to terms with the past" in Germany and Japan bears
much greater similarity than a superficial view would suggest. A more
nuanced view of the treatment of the past in the two former Axis powers
confirms the dictum that "political divisions and interests ... are important
for rendering some historical views more or less acceptable," while giving
less of a hearing to others.33
The increased public and scholarly attention now being paid in North
America to the Pacific War returns us in certain respects to the ways in
which that aspect of the war was perceived in North America at the time.
During World War II itself, and not least because of the outrage caused by
the Japanese "sneak attack" on Pearl Harbor, "for most Americans, the
Pacific conflict was a matter of much greater concern than the war in
Europe."34 Moreover, both because it took some years for "the Holocaust" to
congeal in the popular mind as a single-minded, coherent policy of genocide
against the Jews and because the mostly non-Christian Japanese were
viewed through dark racial lenses, "great numbers of Americans, British,
and Australians continued to believe that the enemy in Asia had been even
more heinous than the German one" for years after the war.3 5 Yet the
charges of genocide and Holocaust have been the catalyst for recovering the
memory of the Asian war in the eyes of North Americans. The renewed
attention to the Asian theater in World War II restores a more balanced and
globally inclusive view of that war, even as events in the Pacific are refracted
through the prism of the quintessentially European experience of the
Holocaust.
The return of the Asian war to popular notoriety in North America is
also the result of demographic changes set in motion by World War H. The
32 See JEFFREY HERF, DIVIDED MEMORY: THE NAZI PAST IN THE Two GERMANYS (1997);
CHRISTIAN PROSS, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE STRUGGLE OVER REPARATIONS FOR SURVIVING
VICTIMS OF THE NAZI TERROR (Belinda Cooper trans.) (1998 [1988]), NORBERT FREI,
VERGANGENHErISPOLITIK: DIE ANFANGE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK UND DIE NS-VERGANGENHEIT
(1996; an English translation is being prepared for publication by Columbia University Press);
Bob Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany, 101 Amer.
I-list. Rev. 1008 (1996).
33 Charles Maier, Foreword, in THE NANJING MASSACRE IN HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY xii
(Joshua A. Fogel ed., 2000).
- NOVICK, supra note 20, at 26.
- DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT, supra note 29, at 446.
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Chinese Exclusion Acts, first instituted in the 1880s, were repealed during
the war as an unnecessary affront to a country with which the United States
was allied in the fighting. Subsequent changes in immigration laws,
themselves associated with the delegitimation of racial discrimination
spurred on by the Holocaust and the civil rights movement, have fuelled the
growth of Chinese immigrant communities in North America that have
vigorously promoted commemoration of the outrages carried out by the
Japanese during World War II. It is thus no coincidence that Iris Chang is the
daughter of Chinese immigrants to the United States, and that she became
involved in publicizing the atrocities committed by the Japanese in Nanjing
as a result of her involvement with Chinese-American activists devoted to
cultivating the memory of those events.3 The incendiary language in
Chang's treatment of the Nanjing massacre would hardly have been
conceivable had she been in China, where the government is not especially
tolerant of grassroots participation in foreign policy, and where the matter of
atrocities during the Japanese attempt to create a "Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere" remains a delicate diplomatic matter.37
The involvement of Chinese-American and similar recent immigrant
groups in calling attention to Japanese misdeeds during World War II points
to the importance of racial and ethnic diasporas in stimulating discussion of
past injustices. The Chinese diaspora in North America and the Jewish
diasporas have been central to pressing reparations agendas concerning the
misdeeds perpetrated against their respective peoples. Also important has
been the African diaspora, which is, of course, of long standing in the
Americas. Those who call attention to the connections between colonialism,
the slave trade, slavery itself, and the continuing discrimination against those
of African descent in the United States and elsewhere have done so in part
by insisting on the community of identity and interests among the
inhabitants of Africa and African-descended peoples elsewhere.
Indeed, in his recent plea for the United States government to pay
reparations to black Americans for the crimes of slavery and the subsequent
36 Chang notes that her involvement in the cause of commemorating and seeking
reparations for the Rape of Nanking was galvanized by her attendance at a 1994 conference of
the Global Alliance for Preserving the History of World War II in Asia in Cupertino, CA. The
website of the Alliance for Preserving the Truth of Sino-Japanese War, a member of the Global
Alliance, can be found at <http://www.sjwar.org>.
37 See China: Warning to Japan, NEW YORK TIMES (West Coast edition), Aug. 12, 2000, at A4,
for the ongoing trouble caused in Sino-Japanese relations when Japanese officials visit Yasukuni
Shrine, which is dedicated to those who died in battle for the imperial cause.
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discrimination and disadvantage they have suffered, Randall Robinson
begins by insisting that blacks must become more familiar with their roots in
a forgotten heroic Africa if they are successfully to assert themselves as
equals in American society.38 Elsewhere Robinson has argued that "all
memory of Africa's greatness in antiquity... [was] stripped from the
consciousness of slavery's direct and derivative contemporary victims." 39
Robinson's views reflect the effort to assert a consciousness of connections
between Africa and its diaspora that, it is assumed, will help to undergird
reparations claims on both sides of the Atlantic.
Yet the position of black Americans is awkward in regard to attempts to
cultivate awareness of the loss of African roots as a foundation for
reparations claims or, more broadly, for the enhancement of black self-image
in general. Even if the Middle Passage could not entirely eradicate the
cultural inheritance of African slaves, that trail of tears radically cut their ties
with their origins and led to the creation of a largely novel ethnoracial group.
Perhaps the most similar trajectory has been that traveled by the "Cape
Colored" people of South Africa, who developed out of the intermixing of
slave populations drawn from the islands of south and southeast Asia with
their masters and with indigenous Africans. Afro-Americans are more
closely descended of their African forebears than are the Cape Coloreds, but
neither group has more than weak ties to their cultures of origin. Because
neither American blacks nor Coloreds were enslaved on their home ground,
their fate has been to become by and large the products of their new
environment. As a result, unlike "indigenous" groups, they cannot lay claim
to having been deprived of their lands and of having had their culture
repressed by alien invaders. Indeed, their cultures are largely the product of
interaction with Europeans and their descendants, rather than any
unadulterated holdover from their regions of origin4°
As a result of this genealogy, American blacks who seriously explore
their connections with Africa often find that their putative African roots are
rather shallower than they had believed. The rise of the designation
"African-American" has tended to promote the notion that blacks are just
another immigrant group in the American melting pot, but this is precisely
what they are not. Appeals to a lost African heritage in the service of claims
3 See RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (1999).
39 Transcript of a forum on The Case for Black Reparations, held in the offices of the
TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D. C., January 11, 2000.
10 On these points, see GEORGE FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN
AMERICAN & SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY 255-257 (1981).
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to reparations designed to transform blacks' status in American society are
thus likely to seem quixotic at best outside of intellectual circles. By
suggesting parallels with the history of European and other immigrants,
indeed, such appeals may undermine the distinctiveness of the black
experience which is the only plausible ground for reparations demands.
Against this background, recent campaigns to obtain reparations for
slavery and segregation in the United States4' may be usefully analyzed in
terms of the commemorative/ transformative distinction developed earlier.
In 1994, the survivors and descendants of a racially motivated rampage in
Rosewood, Florida in 1923 were compensated in various ways for their
suffering, though notably without any official statement of apology.
Similarly, in 1997 the surviving victims of the Tuskegee syphilis experiments
received compensation payments and a presidential apology for their
mistreatment. 42 It is notable that each of these cases is an instance of
commemorative reparations, addressed to specific and acute experiences of
mistreatment. Other such cases are waiting in the wings. The Tulsa Race
Riot Commission recently proposed reparations of at least $33 million in
compensation for the damage and losses suffered by the victims and their
heirs.43
If the uproar provoked by Congressman Tony Hall's proposed 1997
resolution apologizing to blacks for slavery, however, the prospects of
transformative reparations to American blacks for slavery and the long saga
of racial injustices seem dim indeed. Partially, this is a function of the fact
that the amounts of money that would be necessary to make any significant
dent in white-black inequality would be vast and likely to provoke
substantial political opposition. More to the point, however, with a
conservative Republican government newly installed in the U. S. capital,
such reparations would seem to be politically simply a non-starter, at least
for the foreseeable future. Still, in what Wole Soyinka has called the current
"fin de mill~naire fever of atonement" 44, commemorative reparations for
more limited and specific instances of injustice should not be ruled out.
41 See Fornm: Making the Case for Racial Reparations, HARPER'S 37 (Nov. 2000).
42 See Eric Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American
Claiins, 19 B. C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 480 (1998).
4 See Brent Staples, Unearthing Tulsa, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 19,1999, at 65.
44 WOLE SOYINKA, supra note 23, at 90.
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IV. THE POLITICS OF "REPARATIONS POLITICS"
Race and ethnicity have an intuitive appeal as criteria for determining
membership in a victim group - just as they were so used by many of the
oppressors of the groups raising demands for reparations today. The history
and consequences of the race idea, and the possibility of assimilating the
experience of racial groups to that suffered by the Jews, have thrust the
category of race into the forefront of debates over reparations. We have
already seen that it has been difficult for victims of Communism to gain
recognition for their claims due to the lack of an ongoing historical reference
group, and the corresponding efforts on the part of advocates for those
claims to draw analogies between assorted Communist horrors and the
Holocaust trope.
Similar difficulties have confronted those who have suffered injustices
and atrocities on account of their gender. Despite the fact that women are
often subjected to mass rape as a strategy of intimidation and defilement in
wartime, "the case of the [primarily Korean] comfort women is the only
instance in which gender has been used as the basis for victimization and in
which it has become the banner for demands of restitution and apology."Yet
the race of the victims - Asians regarded as inferiors by their Japanese
exploiters - has been important in making their case for reparations
plausible.
Despite the apparent neatness of racial boundaries in everyday life, the
often complicated boundary-drawing processes that could be necessary to
determine who might be the proper beneficiaries, and who the targets, of
reparations campaigns raises serious difficulties for transformative
reparations projects. The problem of determining the proper addressee of an
African reparations campaign, for example, caused considerable
embarrassment in the OAU Summit on the issue that was convened in 1993.
Should reparations be sought from those countries that benefited from
slavery or, as the Tunisian delegate to the conference proposed, for the
damage caused by European colonialism? The role of North Africans and
Middle Easterners, not to mention sub-Saharan Africans themselves, in the
slave trade threatened to muddy the historical waters. As one commentator
put it, a campaign directed against colonialism rather than slavery "would
require a totally different orientation and strategy; it would expand to
embrace the indigenes of both North and South America, Australia, and
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-2000-2003
New Zealand."45 Needless to say, such a transformation of the campaign
would deflect attention away from the experiences and demands of Africans
and their descendants in the diaspora. Who among those groups would
constitute legitimate beneficiaries of reparations raises further, seemingly
intractable problems.
Beyond these difficulties, reparations politics also has a curiously
apolitical quality about it. The notion of gaining compensation for those who
have suffered injustice in the past seems at first glance inherently
uncontroversial - of course, why not? The decline of the nation-state as a
legitimate force promoting social and political integration and the more or
less simultaneous decline of the socialist project have weakened the appeal
of a transformative politics that speaks to the vast majority, as socialism once
attempted to do. Reparations politics presents itself in this climate as an
appealing alternative to the tribulations of coalition-building. Whatever the
potential benefits of reparations campaigns, they should not be mistaken for
a broadly based politics capable of challenging the fundamental distribution
of wealth and power in society. 46
The recent flowering of "rights talk" and the pursuit of damages for
historical injustices both reflect and promote the "juridification" of politics.
In the absence of a progressive political project with broad cross-racial
appeal, a politics of legal disputation rather than of mass mobilization comes
to the fore. Reparations politics is typically a politics of courtrooms and legal
briefs, not street demonstrations. It is consistent with an era of
"individualization," in which the expansive solidarities of the Fordist age
increasingly seem a thing of the past, and even mildly ameliorative
responses to racial inequality encounter strong political headwinds. Thus
legal scholar Robert Westley begins his recent analysis of reparations for
black Americans by noting that affirmative action is "almost dead," and that
therefore "mapping a legal path to enforcement of Black reparations ...
remains a challenge for legal theorists and policymakers attempting to
pursue alternative routes to social justice." 47 It remains to be seen whether
reparations politics will gain much traction beyond the ranks of lawyers and
45 The scene is described in WOLE SOYINKA, THE BURDEN OF MEMORY, supra note 23, at 45-
47; see also Bethwell Ogot, The Muslim Trade, WORLD PRESS REV. Aug. 1993, at 23.
4 For a critique of reparations for slavery from a socialist perspective, see Adolph L. Reed,
Jr., The Case Against Reparations, 64 THE PROGRESSIVE, Dec. 2000, at 15.
47 Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is it Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?
40 Bos. C. L. REV. 429,433 (1998).
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intellectuals, who so far clearly dominate the discussion of reparations for
black Americans.
Finally, in many contexts reparations politics seem destined to generate
their own backlash, as with any politics that promises benefits for specific
groups rather than for "everyone" (though admittedly the latter is a rare
bird). The likelihood of a backlash is not necessarily a reason to forgo this
avenue. Much politics provokes backlash of one sort or another, and in the
reigning absence of a convincing universalist project, the forward-looking
aspects of reparations politics may have much to offer in contemporary
struggles to enhance equality both within countries and on a global scale.
The fact that there are many who have suffered unjustly by no means
insures, however, that everyone will regard compensation to specific groups
as appropriate, no matter how demonstrable the injustices done to them.
Indeed, some fear that the heightened attention to reparations payments for
former slave laborers may be adding fuel to a resurgence of anti-Semitism in
contemporary Germany, despite the fact that many of them were not Jews at
all but Slavic groups slated by the Nazis for a perpetual subaltern status.48 It
makes sense to take seriously the possible backlash against those pursuing
reparations.
V. CONCLUSION
In an age that has become deeply preoccupied by the injustices of the
past, the desire to gain reparations for a variety of historical injustices has
come to be experienced as urgent in many quarters around the world. I have
tried to show that such reparations are commemorative or transformative in
orientation, and that misdeeds and inequities rooted in the idea of race have
been at the center of both kinds of reparations politics. The emergence of the
Holocaust as central to our historical consciousness has helped to promote
attention to other injustices in quite different contexts, not least those
perpetrated in the Pacific theater of World War II, and to give greater
legitimacy to reparations claims deriving from those experiences. I have also
raised some doubts about reparations politics as a transformative politics.
Notwithstanding these objections, however, reparations politics will occupy
a prominent place in the global political landscape of the 21st century.
48 See Edmund L. Andrews, Germans Sign Agreement to Pay Forced Laborers of Nazi Era, &
Roger Cohen, Fonner Soviet Jews Find Uneasy Peace in Germany, NEW YORK TIMES (West Coast
edition), Aug. 6,2000, at 1, 6.

